Instantie
Court of Appeals of New York
Samenvatting
Court of Appeals of New York kent co-ouder-adoptie toe bij zowel ongehuwd
heteroseksueel als lesbisch ouderpaar. Gezamenlijk verzoek tot co-ouder-adoptie
door de mannelijke ongehuwde partner en de moeder van Jacob en door de
vrouwelijke ongehuwde partner en de moeder van Dana. De Court of Appeals
oordeelt dat het `in the best interest of the child’ is de co-ouder-adoptie
in beide situaties toe te staan ongeacht de huwelijkse staat of de sexuele
geaardheid van verzoekers. De bewoording van Domestic Relations
aw $ 110 and 117 doen daar niets aan af.
Volledige tekst
Opinion of the Court
KAYE, Chief Judge.
Under the New York adoption statute, a single person can adopt a child
(Domestic Relations Law s 110). Equally clear is the right of a single
homosexual to adopt (see, 18 NYCRR 421.16[h][2] [qualified adoption agencies
`shall not reject[ ] [adoption petitions] solely on the basis of homosexuality’]
).These appeals call upon us to decide if the unmarried partner of a child’s
biological mother, whether heterosexual or homosexual, who is raising the
child together with the biological parent, can become the child’s second
parent by means of adoption.
Because the two adoptions sought – one by an unmarried heterosexual couple,
the other by the lesbian partner of the child’s mother – are fully consistent
with the adoption statute, we answer this question in the affirmative.To
rule otherwise would mean that the thousands of New York children actually
being raised in homes headed by two unmarried persons could have only one
legal parent, not the two who want them.
The Adoptions Sought
In Matter of Jacob, Roseanne M.A. and Jacob’s biological father (from whom
she is divorced) separated prior to the child’s birth and Roseanne M.A.
was awarded sole custody. Jacob was a year old when Stephen T.K. began
living with him and his mother in early 1991.At the time of filing the
joint petition for adoption three years later, Stephen T.K. was employed
as a programmer/analyst with an annual income of $50,000, while Roseanne
M.A. was a student at SUNY Health Center. Jacob’s biological father consented
to the adoption.
Though acknowledging that `the granting of an adoption in this matter may
be beneficial to Jacob,’ Family Court dismissed the petition for lack of
standing on the ground that Domestic Relations Law s 110 does not authorize
adoptions by an unmarried couple. The Appellate Division affirmed, two
Justices dissenting (210 A.D.2d 876, 620 N.Y.S.2d 640), and an appeal to
this Court was taken as of right.
In Matter of Dana, appellants are G.M. and her lesbian partner, P.I., who
have lived together in what is described as a long and close relationship
for the past 19 years. G.M. works as a special education teacher in the
public schools earning $38,000 annually and P.I., employed at an athletic
club, has an annual income of $48,000. In 1989, the two women decided that
P.I. would have a child they would raise together. P.I. was artificially
inseminated by an anonymous donor, and on June 6, 1990, she gave birth
to Dana. G.M. and P.I. have shared parenting responsibilities since Dana’s
birthand have arranged their separate work schedules around her needs.
With P.I.’s consent, G.M. filed a petition to adopt Dana in April 1993.
In the court-ordered report recommending that G.M. be permitted to adopt
(see, Domestic Relations Law s 116), the disinterested investigator described
Dana as an attractive, sturdy and articulate little girl with a `rich family
life,’ which includes frequent visits with G.M.’s three grown children
from a previous marriage `who all love Dana and accept her as their baby
sister.’ Noting that G.M. `only has the best interest of Dana in mind,’
the report concluded that she `provides her with a family structure in
which to grow and flourish.’
As in Matter of Jacob, Family Court, while conceding the favourable results
of the home study and `in no way disparaging the ability of [G.M.] to be
a good, nurturing and loving parent,’ denied the petition for lack of standing.
In addition, the court held that the adoption was further prohibited by
Domestic Relations Law s 117 which it interpreted to require the automatic
termination of P.I.’s relationship with Dana upon an adoption by G.M. Despite
its conclusion that G.M. had standing to adopt, the Appellate Division
nevertheless affirmed on the ground that Domestic Relations
aw s 117 prohibits the adoption (209 A.D.2d8, 624 N.Y.S.2d 634). We granted
leave to appeal.
Limiting our analysis, as did the courts below, to the preserved statutory
interpretation issues, we conclude that appellants have standing to adopt
under Domestic Relations Law s 110 and are not foreclosed from doing so
by Domestic Relations Law s 117. There being no statutory preclusion, we
now reverse the order of the Appellate Division in each case and remit
the matter to Family Court for a factual evaluation and determination as
to whether these adoptions would be in the best interest of the children.
The Context of our Statutory Analysis
Two basic themes of overarching significance set the context of our statutory
analysis
[1] First and foremost, since adoption in this State is `solely the creature
of * * * statute’ (Matter of Eaton, 305 N.Y. 162, 165, 111 N.E.2d 431),
the adoption statute must be strictly construed. What is to be construed
strictly and applied rigorously in this sensitive area of the law, however,
is legislative purpose as well as legislative language. Thus, the adoption
statute must be applied in harmony with the humanitarian principle that
adoption is a means of securing the best possible home for a child (see
Matter of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 571-572, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 331
N.E.2d 486)
(…)
This policy would certainly be advanced in situations like those presented
here by allowing the two adults who actually function as a child’s parents
to become the child’s legal parents. The advantages which would result
from such an adoption include Social Security and life insurance benefits
in the event of a parent’s death or disability, the right to sue for the
wrongful death of a parent, the right to inherit under rules of intestacy
(see In re Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320) and eligibility for
coverage under both parents’ health insurance policies. In addition, granting
a second parent adoption further ensures that two adults are legally entitled
to make medical decisions for the child in case of emergency and are under
a legal obligation for the child’s economic support (see, Domestic Relations
aw s 32).
Even more important, however, is the emotional security of knowing that
in the event of the biological parent’s death or disability, the other
parent will have presumptive custody, and the children’s relationship with
their parents, siblings and other relatives will continue should the coparents
separate. Indeed, viewed from the children’s perspective, permitting the
adoptions allows the children to achieve a measure of permanency with both
parent figures and avoids the sort of disruptive visitation battle we faced
in Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M. (see, 77 N.Y.2d 651, 656, 569 N.Y.S.2d
586, 572 N.E.2d 27 [‘Petitioner concedes that she is not the child’s `parent’
* * * by virtue of an adoption.’] ).
A second, related point of overriding significance is that the various
sections comprising New York’s adoption statute today represent a complex
and not entirely reconcilable patchwork. Amended innumerable times since
its passage in 1873, the adoption statute was last consolidated nearly
60 years ago, in 1938 (L.1938, ch. 606). Thus, after decades of piecemeal
amendment upon amendment, the statute today contains language from the
1870’s alongside language from the 1990’s.
Though courts surely must, and do, strive to give effect to every word
of a statute, our analysis must recognize the difficulty – perhaps unique
difficulty – of such an endeavour here. With its long, tortuous history,
New York’s adoption statute today is a far cry from a `methodical[ ] and
meticulous [ ]’ expression of legislative judgment (dissenting opn, at
683, at 733 of 636 N.Y.S.2d, at 414 of 660 N.E.2d). That the questions
posed by these appeals are not readily answerable by reference to the words
of a particular section of the law, but instead require the traditional
and often close and difficult task of statutory interpretation is evident
even in the length of today’s opinions – whichever result is reached.
Against this backdrop, we turn to the particular provisions at issue. [FN1]
(…)
Domestic Relations Law 110
[2] Despite ambiguity in other sections, one thing is clear: section 110
allows appellants to become adoptive parents. Domestic Relations Law s
110, entitled `Who May Adopt,’ provides that an `adult unmarried person
or an adult husband and his adult wife together may adopt another person’
(Domestic Relations Law s 110). Under this language, both appellant G.M.
in Matter of Dana and appellant Stephen T.K. in Matter of Jacob, as adult
unmarried persons, have standing to adopt and appellants are correct that
the Court’s analysis of section 110 could appropriately end here.
(…)
Endowing the word `together’ as used in section 110 with the overpowering
significance of enforcing a policy in favour of marriage (as the dissent
does) would require us to rewrite the statute. The statute uses the word
`together’ only to describe married persons and thus does not preclude
an unmarried person in a relationship with another unmarried person from
adopting. Rather, by insisting on the joint consent of the married persons,
the statutory term `together’ simply insures that one spouse cannot adopt
a child without the other spouse’s knowledge or over the other’s objection
(see,
.1984, ch. 218, Mem. of State Dept. of Social Services, 1984 McKinney’s
Session Laws of NY, at 3184). Since each of the biological mothers here
is not only aware of these proceedings, but has expressly consented to
the adoptions, section 110 poses no statutory impediment.
(…)
The conclusion that appellants have standing to adopt is also supported
by the history of section 110. The pattern of amendments since the end
of World War II evidences a successive expansion of the categories of persons
entitled to adopt regardless of their marital status or sexual orientation.
The language in section 110 permitting adoptions by `an adult or minor
husband and his adult or minor wife together,’ for example, is the result
of 1951 legislation intended to enlarge the class of potential adoptive
parents to include minors (Bill Jacket,
.1951, ch. 211, Mem. of Assn. of Bar of City of N.Y., Committee on State
Legislation, at 119; 1943 Opns. Atty. Gen. 260). The sponsors of the bill,
passed during the Korean War, were concerned that the child of a young
father drafted into the military would be unable to take his father’s surname
(Bill Jacket, L.1951, ch. 211, Mem. of Legal Aid Society, at 9).
(…)
[3] A reading of section 110 granting appellants, as unmarried second parents,
standing to adopt is therefore consistent with the words of the statute
as well as the spirit behind the modern-day amendments: encouraging the
adoption of as many children as possible regardless of the sexual orientation
or marital status of the individuals seeking to adopt them.
Domestic Relations Law s 117
[4] Appellants having standing to adopt pursuant to Domestic Relations
Law s 110, the other statutory obstacle relied upon by the lower courts
in denying the petitions is the provision that `[a]fter the making of an
order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved
of all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall
have no rights over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or
succession’ (Domestic Relations Law s 117[1][a]). Literal application of
this language would effectively prevent these adoptions since it would
require the termination of the biological mothers’ rights upon adoption
thereby placing appellants in the `Catch-22′ of having to choose one of
two coparents as the child’s only legal parent.
As outlined below, however, neither the language nor policy underlying
section 117 dictates that result.
The Language of Section 117. Both the title of section 117 (‘Effect of
adoption’) and its opening phrase (‘After the making of an order of adoption’)
suggest that the section has nothing to do with the standing of an individual
to adopt, an issue treated exclusively in section 110 (see, at 660- 662,
at 719-720 of 636 N.Y.S.2d, at 400-401 of 660 N.E.2d, supra). Rather, section
117 addresses the legal effect of an adoption on the parties and their
property.
(…)
One conclusion that can be drawn, however, is that section 117 does not
invariably require termination in the situation where the biological parent,
having consented to the adoption, has agreed to retain parental rights
and to raise the child together with the second parent. Despite their varying
factual circumstances, each of the adoptions described above – stepparent
adoptions, adoptions by minor fathers and open adoptions – share such an
agreement as a common denominator. Because the facts of the cases before
us are directly analogous to these three situations, the half-century-old
termination language of section 117 should not be read to preclude the
adoptions here. Phrased slightly differently, `the desire for consistency
in the law should not of itself sever the bonds between the child and the
natural relatives’ (People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 326,
445 N.Y.S.2d 420, 429 N.E.2d 1049, supra).
(…)
‘Where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, the
courts will adopt that which avoids injustice, hardship, constitutional
doubts or other objectionable results’ (Kauffman & Sons Saddlery Co. v.
Miller, 298 N.Y. 38, 44, 80 N.E.2d 322 [Fuld, J.]; see also, McKinney’s
Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes s 150). Given that section 117 is open
to two differing interpretations as to whether it automatically terminates
parental rights in all cases, a construction of the section that would
deny children like Jacob and Dana the opportunity of having their two de
facto parents become their legal parents, based solely on their biological
mother’s sexual orientation or marital status, would not only be unjust
under the circumstances, but also might raise constitutional concerns in
light of the adoption statute’s historically consistent purpose – the best
interests of the child. (See, e.g., Gomez v Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538, 93
S.Ct. 872, 875, 35
.Ed.2d 56 [Equal Protection Clause prevents unequal treatment of children
whose parents are unmarried]; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220, 102 S.Ct.
2382, 2396, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 [State may not direct the onus of parent’s perceived
`misconduct against his (or her) children’]; Matter of Burns, 55 N.Y.2d
501, 507-510, 450 N.Y.S.2d 173, 435 N.E.2d 390 [New York statute requiring
child born out of wedlock to prove `acknowledgment’ by deceased parent
did not further legitimate State interest]; see also, Matter of Best, 66
N.Y.2d 151, 160, n. 4, 495 N.Y.S.2d 345, 485 N.E.2d 1010, supra ).
(…)
These concerns are particularly weighty in Matter of Dana. Even if the
Court were to rule against him on this appeal, the male petitioner in Matter
of Jacob could still adopt by marrying Jacob’s mother. Dana, however, would
be irrevocably deprived of the benefits and entitlements of having as her
legal parents the two individuals who have already assumed that role in
her life, simply as a consequence of her mother’s sexual orientation.
Any proffered justification for rejecting these petitions based on a governmental
policy disapproving of homosexuality or encouraging marriage would not
apply. As noted above, New York has not adopted a policy disfavouring adoption
by either single persons or homosexuals. In fact, the most recent legislative
document relating to the subject urges courts to construe section 117 in
precisely the manner we have as it cautions against discrimination against
`nonmarital children’ and `unwed parents’ (see, at 664, at 721 of 636 N.Y.S.2d,
at 402 of 660 N.E.2d, supra ). An interpretation of the statute that avoids
such discrimination or hardship is all the more appropriate here where
a contrary ruling could jeopardize the legal status of the many New York
children whose adoptions by second parents have already taken place (e.g.,
Matter of Camilla, 163 Misc.2d 272, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897; Matter of Evan, 153
Misc.2d 844, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997; Matter of A.J.J., 108 Misc.2d 657, 438 N.Y.S.2d
444).
Conclusion
To be sure, the Legislature that last codified section 117 in 1938 may
never have envisioned families that `include[ ] two adult lifetime partners
whose relationship is characterized by an emotional and financial commitment
and interdependence’ (Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 211,
544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 543 N.E.2d 49). Nonetheless, it is clear that section
117, designed as a shield to protect new adoptive families, was never intended
as a sword to prohibit otherwise beneficial intrafamily adoptions by second
parents. Accordingly, in each proceeding, the order of the Appellate Division
should be reversed, without costs, the adoption petition reinstated and
the matter remitted to Family Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
(…)
Rechters
Mrs Kaye, Chief Judge, Smith, Levine, Ciparick, and Bellacosa, Simons andTitone
