Het vernietigen van embryo’s na intrekking van wettelijk vereiste toestemming van één der genetische ouders levert geen strijd op met art. 2 EVRM, aangezien embryo’s naar Engels recht geen recht op leven hebben. Het absolute wettelijke vereiste van toestemming van beide genetische ouders tot het moment van terugplaatsen van embryo’s bij de vrouw laat geen onredelijke afweging zien tussen de rechten van de vrouwelijke en mannelijke donor onder art. 8 EVRM.

In 2000 werd bij mw. Evans kanker geconstateerd in haar eierstokken. Voor de verwijdering van haar eierstokken is een aantal eicellen verwijderd, die na de vereiste toestemming van haar toenmalige partner J. gekregen te hebben, zijn bevrucht en voor enkele jaren bewaard. Voordat het medisch mogelijk was om deze embryo’s terug te plaatsen bij Evans is de relatie verbroken. J. heeft daarop zijn toestemming tot het gebruik en het bewaren van de embryo’s ingetrokken en de kliniek verzocht deze te vernietigen. Gerechtelijke stappen leverden Evans niets op, aangezien de toestemming van beide partners wettelijk vereist was tot het moment dat de embryo’s teruggeplaatst waren. Evans klaagt nu over een schending van het recht op leven (art. 2 EVRM) en het recht op bescherming van het privé- en gezinsleven (art. 8 EVRM).
Het Hof overweegt onder art. 2 EVRM dat uit eerdere jurisprudentie blijkt dat er geen consensus bestaat over de vraag wanneer het leven begint en staten op dit punt een grote beoordelingsruimte toekomt. Naar Engels recht hebben embryo’s geen recht op leven en derhalve is art. 2 EVRM niet geschonden ( 56).
Het Hof herhaalt dat in casu art. 8 EVRM van toepassing is en dat het in deze zaak om de bescherming van het privéleven gaat ( 71). Daarbij benadrukt het Hof dat het om een botsing tussen twee art. 8 EVRM-rechten gaat die volkomen onverenigbaar zijn ( 73). Gezien het gebrek aan consensus en het feit dat het om een gevoelig moreel en ethisch onderwerp gaat, heeft de staat een ruime beoordelingsvrijheid ( 81). Het Hof acht de absolute aard van de regeling niet per definitie in strijd met art. 8 EVRM, aangezien deze ten doel had de rechtszekerheid te bevorderen en willekeur en inconsistentie bij een belangenafweging te vermijden. In de ogen van het Hof zijn dit legitieme doelen die niet strijdig zijn met art. 8 EVRM ( 89). Het recht van Evans om biologische moeder te worden weegt volgens het Hof niet zwaarder dan het recht van J. om geen vader te worden van Evans" kind ( 90). Wellicht had het parlement een andere wettelijke regeling aan kunnen nemen, maar dat is niet de vraag die het Hof moet beantwoorden. De vraag is of het Verenigd Koninkrijk de beoordelingsvrijheid heeft overschreden door deze grens te stellen ( 91). Het Hof concludeert dat er, mede gezien het gebrek aan consensus, in casu sprake is van een "fair balance" tussen de verschillende belangen, en derhalve geen schending van art. 8 ( 92).
Het Hof constateert ook geen schending van art. 14 jo. art. 8 EVRM, aangezien de rechtvaardiging onder art. 8 EVRM ook onder art. 14 EVRM als objectieve en redelijke rechtvaardiging aangevoerd kan worden ( 95).

Rechters: Rozakis, C.L.; Costa, J.-P.; Nicolas Bratza; Zupancic, B.M.; Lorenzen, P.; Tü rmen,; R.; Butkevych, V.; Vajic, N.; Tsatsa-Nikolovska, M.; Baka, A.B.; Kovler, A.; Zagrebelsky,; V.; Mularoni, A.; Spielmann, D.; Jaeger, R.; David Thó r Bjö rgvinsson; Ziemele, I.

Uitspraak

Feiten en nationaal procesverloop
Op 12 juli 2000 begonnen mw. Evans en haar toenmalige partner J. aan een behandeling in de Bath Assisted Conception Clinic. In oktober van dat jaar, tijdens een bezoek aan de kliniek, kregen zij te horen dat Evans tumoren had in beide eierstokken en dat deze verwijderd moesten worden. Er werd uitgelegd dat het mogelijk was om voor de operatie enkele eicellen weg te nemen ten behoeve van IVF, maar hier was haast bij geboden. De bevruchte eicellen zouden twee jaar na de operatie teruggeplaatst kunnen worden. Evans en J. moesten beiden een formulier ondertekenen waarin zij toestemming gaven voor de IVF-behandeling en in overeenstemming met de Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 werd verteld dat beiden tot het moment van terugplaatsen van de embryo’s hun toestemming in konden trekken. Bij navraag door Evans bleek het niet mogelijk om eicellen onbevrucht in te vriezen, aangezien dit een lagere kans van slagen had en deze procedure niet werd uitgevoerd in de desbetreffende kliniek. J. verzekerde haar op dat moment dat dit niet nodig was, aangezien ze toch bij elkaar zouden blijven. Daarop gaven beiden de vereiste toestemming. In november 2001 werden 6 embryo’s gecreëerd en vlak daarna werden de eierstokken van Evans verwijderd. In 2002 werd de relatie tussen Evans en J. verbroken. Kort daarop trok J. zijn toestemming in en verzocht hij de kliniek om de embryo’s te vernietigen. Via de rechter probeerde Evans af te dwingen dat J. het intrekken van zijn toestemming terug zou draaien. Het Engelse High Court wees het verzoek van Evans af. Het achtte het niet onredelijk dat de wet toestemming van beide partners vereist en dat deze toestemming ingetrokken kan worden voor het terugplaatsen van de eicellen in de vrouw. Het intrekken van de toestemming van J. moest dan ook gerespecteerd worden. Ook bij het Court of Appeal werd de klacht van Evans afgewezen. De laatste overwoog daarbij dat het doel van de wet was om te verzekeren dat er continu toestemming was van beide partners om de behandeling door te zetten; sympathie en betrokkenheid met Evans waren niet voldoende om deze regeling disproportioneel te verklaren. Toestemming voor een beroep bij de House of Lords werd afgewezen.
Procesverloop bij het EHRM
Op 11 februari 2005 diende mw. Evans een klacht in bij het Hof waarin zij stelde dat het intrekken van de toestemming en de vernietiging van de embryo’s een schending van het recht op leven (art. 2 EVRM) en het recht op bescherming van het privé- en gezinsleven (art. 8 EVRM) opleverde. Op grond van Rule 39 werd door de president van de Kamer een interimmaatregel opgelegd aan het Verenigd Koninkrijk om er zorg voor te dragen dat de embryo’s niet vernietigd zouden worden voordat het Hof uitspraak had gedaan. Tegelijkertijd besloot de president van de Kamer om, in overeenstemming met Rule 41, de zaak voorrang te verlenen.
Op 27 september 2005 vond een hoorzitting plaats en op 7 maart 2006 deed de Kamer uitspraak. Met betrekking tot de klacht onder art. 2 stelde de Kamer dat in eerdere jurisprudentie (Vo t Frankrijk [GC], no. 53924/00, § 82, ECHR 2004 (NJ 2006, 52, m.nt. EAA)) was vastgesteld dat de vraag wanneer het leven begint op nationaal niveau beantwoord mag worden. De staten hebben hier een grote beoordelingsruimte vanwege het gebrek aan consensus op Europees niveau. In Engeland heeft een embryo geen zelfstandige rechten of belangen en kan dus geen beroep doen op het recht op leven. De Kamer kwam unaniem tot de conclusie dat er geen sprake was van een schending van art. 2 EVRM.
Onder art. 8 EVRM stelde Evans dat de wettelijke mogelijkheid voor J. om zijn toestemming in te trekken een inbreuk vormde op haar recht op bescherming van het privé- en gezinsleven. De Kamer stelde dat het in casu om bescherming van het privéleven ging. Privéleven is een breed begrip waar onder andere de fysieke en sociale identiteit van een individu onder valt, dit omvat ook het recht op persoonlijk autonomie, persoonlijke ontwikkeling en het recht om relaties met anderen aan te gaan en te ontwikkelen. Daarnaast valt hieronder het recht op respect voor de beslissing om wel of juist geen ouder te worden.
De Kamer constateerde dat er geen internationale consensus bestond met betrekking tot de regulering van IVF-behandelingen of het gebruik van embryo’s die met behulp van IVF-behandeling gecreëerd zijn. Over de vraag tot welk moment de toestemming ingetrokken mag worden bestond eveneens geen consensus. Gezien het feit dat het gebruik van IVF-behandelingen over gevoelige ethische en morele kwesties gaat en er geen consensus bestond, kwam aan de staten een grote mate van beoordelingsvrijheid toe.
De Kamer stelde dat de regeling in kwestie het resultaat was van uitgebreid onderzoek naar de sociale, ethische en juridische gevolgen van ontwikkeling op het gebied van bevruchting en embryologie. Het stellen van een bright-line rule, die geen ruimte laat voor een belangenafweging, achtte de Kamer niet in strijd met art. 8 EVRM, aangezien deze regel gebaseerd was op zwaarwegende beleidsoverwegingen die de rechtszekerheid dienen en het publieke vertrouwen in het recht op een zeer gevoelig terrein moeten bewaren.
De Kamer benadrukte, net als nationale hoven, grote sympathie voor Evans te hebben die, zonder de terugplaatsing van de bevruchte eicellen, elke kans op verloor om haar eigen kind te baren. Dit voorkwam echter niet dat de Kamer concludeerde dat het ontbreken van een mogelijkheid om het intrekken van toestemming van één der genetische ouders terzijde te schuiven de vereiste fair balance niet verstoorde.
De Kamer kwam dan ook, met 5 tegen 2, tot de conclusie dat in casu geen sprake was van een schending van art. 8 EVRM.
De klacht onder art. 14 jo. art. 8 EVRM achtte de Kamer unaniem voldoende behandeld onder art. 8 EVRM en concludeerde daarop dat er geen sprake was van een schending van art. 14 EVRM.
Op 5 juni 2006 verzocht klaagster om verwijzing naar de Grote Kamer. Dit werd op 3 juli 2006 toegekend. Tegelijkertijd werd de interimmaatregel die op grond van Rule 39 was uitgevaardigd verlengd.
EHRM:
The law
Alleged violation of article 2 of the convention
53. In her original application and in her observations before the Chamber, the applicant complained that the provisions of English law requiring the embryos to be destroyed once J withdrew his consent to their continued storage violated the embryos’ right to life, contrary to Article 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. …"
54. In its judgment of 7 March 2006, the Chamber recalled that in Vo v. France[GC], no. 53924/00, § 82, ECHR 2004-VIII (NJ 2006, 52 m.nt. EAA; red.), the Grand Chamber had held that, in the absence of any European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life, the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere. Under English law, as was made clear by the domestic courts in the present applicant’s case, an embryo does not have independent rights or interests and cannot claim – or have claimed on its behalf – a right to life under Article 2. There had not, accordingly, been a violation of that provision.
55. The Grand Chamber notes that the applicant has not pursued her complaint under Article 2 in her written or oral submissions to it. However, since cases referred to the Grand Chamber embrace all aspects of the application previously examined by the Chamber (K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 140, ECHR 2001-VII), it is necessary to consider the issue under Article 2.
56. The Grand Chamber, for the reasons given by the Chamber, finds that the embryos created by the applicant and J do not have a right to life within the meaning of Article 2, and that there has not, therefore, been a violation of that provision.
Alleged violation of article 8 of the convention
57. The applicant contended that the provisions of Schedule 3 to the 1990 Act, which permitted J to withdraw his consent after the fertilisation of her eggs with his sperm, violated her rights to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention, which states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life …
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
A.
The Chamber judgment
58.
In its judgment of 7 March 2006 the Chamber held, in summary, that Article 8 was applicable, since the notion of "private life" incorporated the right to respect for both the decisions to become and not to become a parent. The question which arose under Article 8 was "whether there exists a positive obligation on the State to ensure that a woman who has embarked on treatment for the specific purpose of giving birth to a genetically related child should be permitted to proceed to implantation of the embryo notwithstanding the withdrawal of consent by her former partner, the male gamete provider".
59.
Given that there was no international or European consensus with regard to the regulation of IVF treatment, the use of embryos created by such treatment, or the point at which consent to the use of genetic material provided as part of IVF treatment might be withdrawn; and since the use of IVF treatment gave rise to sensitive moral and ethical issues against a background of fast-moving medical and scientific developments, the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State must be a wide one.
60.
The 1990 Act was the culmination of an exceptionally detailed examination of the social, ethical and legal implications of developments in the field of human fertilisation and embryology. Its policy was to ensure continuing consent from the commencement of treatment to the point of implantation in the woman. While the pressing nature of the applicant’s medical condition required that she and J reach a decision about the fertilisation of her eggs without as much time for reflection and advice as might ordinarily be desired, it was undisputed that it was explained to them both that either was free to withdraw consent at any time before the resulting embryo was implanted in the applicant’s uterus. As in Pretty v. the United Kingdom NJ 2004, 543 m.nt. EAA; red.), no. 2346/02, ECHR 2002-III and Odièvre v. France, no. 42326/98, ECHR 2003-III (NJ 2003, 587 m.nt. SW; red.), strong policy considerations underlay the decision of the legislature to favour a clear or "bright-line" rule which would serve both to produce legal certainty and to maintain public confidence in the law in a sensitive field. Like the national courts, the Chamber did not find, therefore, that the absence of a power to override a genetic parent’s withdrawal of consent, even in the exceptional circumstances of the applicant’s case, was such as to upset the fair balance required by Article 8 or to exceed the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the State.
B.
The parties’ submissions
1.
The applicant
61.
The applicant accepted that there should be a regulatory scheme determining the use of reproductive medicine, but submitted that it was neither necessary nor proportionate to permit of no exceptions in the provision of a veto on the use of embryos to either gamete provider.
62.
The female’s role in IVF treatment was much more extensive and emotionally involving than that of the male, who donated his sperm and had no further active physical part to play in the process. The female gamete provider, by contrast, donated eggs, from a finite limited number available to her, after a series of sometimes painful medical interventions designed to maximise the potential for harvesting eggs. In the case of a woman with the applicant’s medical history, she would never again have the opportunity to attempt to create a child using her gametes. Her emotional and physical investment in the process far surpassed that of the man and justified the promotion of her Article 8 rights. Instead, the 1990 Act operated so that the applicant’s rights and freedoms in respect of creating a baby were dependent on J’s whim. He was able to embark on the project of creating embryos with the applicant, offering such assurances as were necessary to convince her to proceed, and then abandon the project when he pleased, taking no responsibility for his original decision to become involved, and under no obligation even to provide an explanation for his behaviour.
63.
The impact of the consent rules in the 1990 Act was such that there would be no way for a woman in the applicant’s position to secure her future prospects of bearing a child, since both a known and an anonymous sperm donor could, on a whim, withdraw consent to her use of embryos created with his sperm. Part of the purpose of reproductive medicine was to provide a possible solution for those who would otherwise be infertile. That purpose was frustrated if there was no scope for exceptions in special circumstances.
64.
Whether the role of the State was analysed in terms of a positive obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the individual’s Article 8 rights, or as an interference requiring justification, it was clear from the case-law that a fair balance had to be struck between the competing interests. There was no necessity for legislation which failed to recognise that exceptional situations, requiring different treatment, might arise. This was a conflict primarily between the respective rights of two private individuals, rather than between the State and an individual, and the proper way to determine a conflict between individuals was by recourse to a court for judicial assessment of the respective positions. In the present case, the clinic was ready and willing to treat the applicant, and should be permitted so to do. The Chamber had overstated the obligation for which the applicant contended: she did not go so far as to claim a duty on the part of the State to ensure that she be permitted to proceed.
65.
A fair appraisal of the Nachmani case (see paragraph 48 above) and the case-law from the United States of America (paragraphs 42-47 above) provided support for her argument. Nachmani was the closest case on its facts to her own, but the applicant’s case was stronger, since she wished to have the embryos implanted in her own uterus, not that of a surrogate. All the decisions from the United States appeared either to apply, or at least to recognise, a test whereby there was a balance of rights and/or interests in the embryos. Moreover, only one of these cases was decided on the basis of a conflict between public policy and private rights, and the case-law therefore supported the applicant’s contention that there was no public interest at stake. As for the position within the Council of Europe, the applicant pointed out that the Chamber appeared to have relied on material which was not available to the parties, although she accepted that there was no consensus in Europe as to whether, in the general run of cases, the man’s consent could be revoked either at any time before implantation, or only up to the point of fertilisation. However, the applicant invited the Court to consider what evidence there was as to how any Council of Europe State would determine a case with the same facts as the present dispute. Just how "bright-line" were the rules even within the four States recorded in the Chamber judgment as permitting withdrawal of consent at any time up to implantation?
66.
While the applicant accepted that, since the statutory maximum storage period had expired by the time of the hearing before the Grand Chamber, she was no longer the victim of J’s direction to the clinic to remove the embryos from storage, she submitted that it was neither necessary nor proportionate to give such a power to a single gamete provider. Human embryos were special: this was the underlying philosophy of the 1990 Act. Yet the Act permitted only one of the couple on a whim to destroy the embryos created by both; even a family pet enjoyed greater protection under the law.
2.
The Government
67.
The Government argued that the Chamber had been incorrect in referring to J’s having withdrawn the consent he had given to the use of his gametes or to the applicant’s having sought to hold him to that consent. In fact, J had never consented to the treatment which the applicant wished to receive, and his consent had always been limited to treatment of the applicant together with him; in practical terms, the consent was predicated on their relationship continuing. When the relationship broke down and the applicant wished to continue with the treatment by herself, the consent which J had given did not extend to the new situation.
68.
The Government contended that the 1990 Act served to promote a number of inter-related policies and interests – the woman’s right to self-determination in respect of pregnancy once the embryo was implanted; the primacy of freely given and informed consent to medical intervention; the interests of any child who might be born as a result of IVF treatment; the equality of treatment between the parties; the promotion of the efficacy and use of IVF and related techniques; and clarity and certainty in relations between partners.
69.
States were entitled to a broad margin of appreciation in this field, given the complexity of the moral and ethical issues to which IVF treatment gave rise, on which opinions within a democratic society might reasonably differ widely. There was no international or European consensus as to the point at which a sperm donor should be allowed effectively to withdraw his consent and prevent the use of his genetic material. Moreover, a wide margin should be applied since the national authorities were required to strike a balance between the competing Convention interests of two individuals, each of whom was entitled to respect for private life.
70.
The fact that the law allowing either party to withdraw his or her consent up until the point of implantation of the embryo did not permit of exception (a "bright line" rule), did not in itself render it disproportionate. If exceptions were permitted, the principle which Parliament legitimately sought to achieve, of ensuring bilateral consent to implantation, would not be achieved. Complexity and arbitrariness would result, and the domestic authorities would be required to balance individuals’ irreconcilable interests, as in the present case.
B.
The Court’s assessment
1.
The nature of the rights at issue under Article 8
71.
It is not disputed between the parties that Article 8 is applicable and that the case concerns the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. The Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber that "private life", which is a broad term encompassing, inter alia, aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity including the right to personal autonomy, personal development and to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world (see Pretty, cited above, § 61), incorporates the right to respect for both the decisions to become and not to become a parent.
72.
It must be noted, however, that the applicant does not complain that she is in any way prevented from becoming a mother in a social, legal, or even physical sense, since there is no rule of domestic law or practice to stop her from adopting a child or even giving birth to a child originally created in vitro from donated gametes. The applicant’s complaint is, more precisely, that the consent provisions of the 1990 Act prevent her from using the embryos she and J created together, and thus, given her particular circumstances, from ever having a child to whom she is genetically related. The Grand Chamber considers that this more limited issue, concerning the right to respect for the decision to become a parent in the genetic sense, also falls within the scope of Article 8.
73.
The dilemma central to the present case is that it involves a conflict between the Article 8 rights of two private individuals: the applicant and J. Moreover, each person’s interest is entirely irreconcilable with the other’s, since if the applicant is permitted to use the embryos, J will be forced to become a father, whereas if J’s refusal or withdrawal of consent is upheld, the applicant will be denied the opportunity of becoming a genetic parent. In the difficult circumstances of this case, whatever solution the national authorities might adopt would result in the interests of one or the other parties to the IVF treatment being wholly frustrated (cf. Odièvre, cited above, § 44).
74.
In addition, the Grand Chamber, like the Chamber, accepts the Government’s submission (see paragraph 68 above) that the case does not involve simply a conflict between individuals; the legislation in question also served a number of wider, public interests, in upholding the principle of the primacy of consent and promoting legal clarity and certainty, for example (compare, again, Odièvre, § 45). The extent to which it was permissible under Article 8 for the State to give weight to these considerations is examined below.
2.
Whether the case involves a positive obligation or an interference
75.
Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. The boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In particular, in both instances regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the competing interests; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (Odièvre, cited above, § 40).
76.
In the domestic proceedings, the parties and the judges treated the issue as one involving an interference by the State with the applicant’s right to respect for her private life, because the relevant provisions of the 1990 Act prevented the clinic from treating her once J had informed it that he did not consent. The Grand Chamber, however, like the Chamber, considers that it is more appropriate to analyse the case as one concerning positive obligations, the principal issue, as in the Odièvre case cited above, being whether the legislative provisions as applied in the present case struck a fair balance between the competing public and private interests involved. In this regard, the Grand Chamber accepts the findings of the domestic courts that J had never consented to the applicant using the jointly created embryos alone – his consent being limited to undergoing "treatment together" with the applicant (see paragraph 24 above). The Court does not find it of importance to the determination of the Convention issue, whether in these circumstances J is to be regarded as having "refused" rather than "withdrawn" his consent to the implantation of the embryos, as the Government argue (paragraph 67 above).
3.
The margin of appreciation
77.
A number of factors must be taken into account when determining the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be enjoyed by the State in any case under Article 8. Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be restricted (see, for example, X. and Y. v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, §§ 24 and 27 (NJ 1985, 525 m.nt. EAA; red.); Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45; Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom[GC], no. 28957/95, § 90, ECHR 2002-VI; cf. Pretty, cited above, § 71). Where, however, there is no consensus within the Member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider (X., Y. and Z. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 April 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II, § 44 (NJ 1998, 235 m.nt. JdB; red.); Frette v. France, no. 36515/97, § 41, ECHR 2002-I (NJ 2002, 553 m.nt. SW; red.); Christine Goodwin, cited above, § 85; see also, mutatis mutandis, Vo, cited above, § 82). There will also usually be a wide margin if the State is required to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights (see Odièvre, §§ 44-49 and Frette§ 42).
78.
The issues raised by the present case are undoubtedly of a morally and ethically delicate nature, and in this connection the Court recalls the words of Lord Bingham in Quintavalle (see paragraph 34 above).
79.
In addition, while the Court is mindful of the applicant’s submission to treat the comparative law data with caution, it is at least clear, and the applicant does not contend otherwise, that there is no uniform European approach in this field. Certain States have enacted primary or secondary legislation to control the use of IVF treatment, whereas in others this is a matter left to medical practice and guidelines. While the United Kingdom is not alone in permitting storage of embryos and in providing both gamete providers with the power freely and effectively to withdraw consent up until the moment of implantation, different rules and practices are applied elsewhere in Europe. It cannot be said that there is any consensus as to the stage in IVF treatment when the gamete providers’ consent becomes irrevocable (see paragraphs 39-42 above).
80.
While the applicant contends that her greater physical and emotional expenditure during the IVF process, and her subsequent infertility, entail that her Article 8 rights should take precedence over J’s, it does not appear to the Court that there is any clear consensus on this point either. The Court of Appeal commented on the difficulty of comparing the effect on J of being forced to become the father of the applicant’s child and that on the applicant of being denied the chance to have genetically-related offspring (see paragraphs 25-26 above), and this difficulty is also reflected in the range of views expressed by the two panels of the Israeli Supreme Court in Nachmani and in the United States case-law (see paragraphs 43-49 above).
81.
In conclusion, therefore, since the use of IVF treatment gives rise to sensitive moral and ethical issues against a background of fast-moving medical and scientific developments, and since the questions raised by the case touch on areas where there is no clear common ground amongst the Member States, the Court considers that the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State must be a wide one (see X., Y. and Z, cited above, § 44).
82.
The Grand Chamber, like the Chamber, considers that the above margin must in principle extend both to the State’s decision whether or not to enact legislation governing the use of IVF treatment and, once having intervened, to the detailed rules it lays down in order to achieve a balance between the competing public and private interests.
4.
Compliance with Article 8
83.
It remains for the Court to determine whether, in the special circumstances of the case, the application of a law which permitted J effectively to withdraw or withhold his consent to the implantation in the applicant’s uterus of the embryos created jointly by them struck a fair balance between the competing interests.
84.
The fact that it is now technically possible to keep human embryos in frozen storage gives rise to an essential difference between IVF and fertilisation through sexual intercourse, namely the possibility of allowing a lapse of time, which may be substantial, to intervene between creation of the embryo and its implantation in the uterus. The Court considers that it is legitimate – and indeed desirable – for a State to set up a legal scheme which takes this possibility of delay into account. In the United Kingdom, the solution adopted in the 1990 Act was to permit storage of embryos for a maximum of five years. In 1996 this period was extended by secondary legislation to ten or more years where one of the gamete providers or the prospective mother is, or is likely to become, prematurely infertile, although storage can never continue after the woman being treated reaches the age of 55 (see paragraph 36 above).
85.
These provisions are complemented by a requirement on the clinic providing the treatment to obtain a prior written consent from each gamete provider, specifying, inter alia, the type of treatment for which the embryo is to be used (Schedule 3, paragraph 2(1) to the 1990 Act), the maximum period of storage, and what is to be done with it in the event of the gamete provider’s death or incapacity (Schedule 3, paragraph 2(2)). Moreover, paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 provides that "the terms of any consent under this Schedule may from time to time be varied, and the consent may be withdrawn, by notice given by the person who gave the consent to the person keeping the gametes or embryo …" up until the point that the embryo has been "used" (that is, implanted in the uterus; see paragraph 37 above). Other States, with different religious, social and political cultures, have adopted different solutions to the technical possibility of delay between fertilisation and implantation (see paragraphs 39-42 above). For the reasons set out above (paragraphs 77-82), the decision as to the principles and policies to be applied in this sensitive field must primarily be for each State to determine.
86.
In this connection the Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber that it is relevant that the 1990 Act was the culmination of an exceptionally detailed examination of the social, ethical and legal implications of developments in the field of human fertilisation and embryology, and the fruit of much reflection, consultation and debate (see, mutatis mutandis, Hatton and others v. the United Kingdom[GC], no. 36022/97, § 128, ECHR 2003-VIII (NJ 2004, 207 m.nt. EJD; red.)).
87.

The potential problems arising from scientific progress in storing human embryos were addressed as early as the Warnock Committee’s Report of 1984, which recommended that a couple should be permitted to store embryos for their own future use for a maximum of ten years, after which time the right of use or disposal should pass to the storage authority. In the event that a couple failed to agree how the shared embryo should be used, the right to determine the use or disposal of the embryo should pass to the "storage authority". The subsequent Green Paper specifically asked interested members of the public what should happen where there was no agreement between a couple as to the use or disposal of an embryo, and the 1987 White Paper noted that those respondents who agreed that storage should be permitted were broadly in favour of the Committee’s recommendations, but that some rejected the idea that the "storage authority" should be empowered to decide the embryo’s fate in the event of conflict between the donors. The Government therefore proposed "that the law should be based on the clear principle that the donor’s wishes are paramount during the period in which embryos or gametes may be stored; and that after the expiry of this period, they may only be used by the licence holder for other purposes if the donor’s consent has been given to this". The White Paper also set out the detail of the proposals on consent, in a form which, after further consultation, was adopted by the legislature in Schedule 3 to the 1990 Act (see paragraphs 29-33 above).
88.
That Schedule places a legal obligation on any clinic carrying out IVF treatment to explain the consent provisions to a person embarking on such treatment and to obtain his or her consent in writing (see paragraph 37 above). It is undisputed that this occurred in the present case, and that the applicant and J both signed the consent forms required by the law. While the pressing nature of the applicant’s medical condition required her to make a decision quickly and under extreme stress, she knew, when consenting to have all her eggs fertilised with J’s sperm, that these would be the last eggs available to her, that it would be some time before her cancer treatment was completed and any embryos could be implanted, and that, as a matter of law, J would be free to withdraw consent to implantation at any moment.
89.
While the applicant criticised the national rules on consent for the fact that they could not be disapplied in any circumstances, the Court does not find that the absolute nature of the law is, in itself, necessarily inconsistent with Article 8 (see also the Pretty and Odièvre cases cited in paragraph 60 above). Respect for human dignity and free will, as well as a desire to ensure a fair balance between the parties to IVF treatment, underlay the legislature’s decision to enact provisions permitting of no exception to ensure that every person donating gametes for the purpose of IVF treatment would know in advance that no use could be made of his or her genetic material without his or her continuing consent. In addition to the principle at stake, the absolute nature of the rule served to promote legal certainty and to avoid the problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent in weighing, on a case by case basis, what the Court of Appeal described as "entirely incommensurable" interests (see paragraphs 25-26 above). In the Court’s view, these general interests pursued by the legislation are legitimate and consistent with Article 8.
90.
As regards the balance struck between the conflicting Article 8 rights of the parties to the IVF treatment, the Grand Chamber, in common with every other court which has examined this case, has great sympathy for the applicant, who clearly desires a genetically related child above all else. However, given the above considerations, including the lack of any European consensus on this point (see paragraph 79 above), it does not consider that the applicant’s right to respect for the decision to become a parent in the genetic sense should be accorded greater weight than J’s right to respect for his decision not to have a genetically-related child with her.
91.
The Court accepts that it would have been possible for Parliament to regulate the situation differently. However, as the Chamber observed, the central question under Article 8 is not whether different rules might have been adopted by the legislature, but whether, in striking the balance at the point at which it did, Parliament exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded to it under that Article.
92.
The Grand Chamber considers that, given the lack of European consensus on this point, the fact that the domestic rules were clear and brought to the attention of the applicant and that they struck a fair balance between the competing interests, there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
Alleged violation of article 14 of the convention taken in conjunction with article 8
93. In her application and in the proceedings before the Chamber, the applicant complained of discrimination contrary to Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, reasoning that a woman who was able to conceive without assistance was subject to no control or influence over how the embryos developed from the moment of fertilisation, whereas a woman such as herself who could conceive only with IVF was, under the 1990 Act, subject to the will of the sperm donor.
94. In her observations to the Grand Chamber, however, the applicant submitted that her complaints under Articles 8 and 14 were inextricably linked, and that if the Court found that the impugned provision of domestic law was proportionate under Article 8, it should also find the scheme reasonably and objectively justified under Article 14.
95. The Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber and the parties that it is not required to decide in the present case whether the applicant could properly complain of a difference of treatment as compared to another woman in an analogous position, because the reasons given for finding that there was no violation of Article 8 also afford a reasonable and objective justification under Article 14 (see, mutatis mutandis, Pretty§ 89).
96. Consequently, there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the court
1. Holds, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention;
2. Holds, by thirteen votes to four, that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention;
3. Holds, by thirteen votes to four, that there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8.
Joint dissenting opinion of judges Türmen, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Spielmann and Ziemele
1. We voted against the finding that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention and no violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8.
2. In the instant case the applicant complained that the impact of the consent rules in the 1990 Act was such that there would be no way for a woman in her position to secure her future prospects of bearing a genetically related child. She explained that part of the purpose of reproductive medicine was to provide a possible solution for those who would otherwise be infertile. That purpose was frustrated if there was no scope for exceptions in special circumstances (see paragraphs 62-64 of the judgment).
3. The parties and the Court agreed that Article 8 was applicable and that the case concerned the applicant’s right to respect for her private life (paragraph 71). The Court went on to say (paragraph 72) that the more specific issue concerning the right to respect for the decision to become a parent in the genetic sense also fell within the scope of Article 8. We agree with the Court’s reasoning as concerns the applicability of Article 8 and the more specific issue at stake. We would like to underline the importance of the Court’s statement as to the applicability of Article 8 in the circumstances of the case.
4. In its assessment the Court examined the nature of the rights at issue under Article 8 (paragraphs 71-74) and whether the case involved a positive obligation or an interference (paragraphs 75-76). On the first issue the Court stated that the case involved a conflict between the Article 8 rights of two private individuals (paragraph 73) and added that the impugned legislation also served a number of wider, public interests, in upholding the primacy of consent and promoting legal clarity and certainty (paragraph 74). Considering that it was more appropriate to analyse the case as one concerning positive obligations, the Court stated that the principal issue was whether the legislative provisions as applied in the present case struck a fair balance between the competing public and private interests involved (paragraph 76). Moreover, the Court considered that since the use of in vitro fertilisation ("IVF") treatment gave rise to sensitive moral and ethical issues against a background of fast-moving medical and scientific developments, and since the questions raised by the case touched on areas where there was no clear common ground amongst member States, the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State had to be a wide one (paragraph 81). This margin of appreciation must, according to the Court, in principle extend both to the State’s decision whether or not to enact legislation governing the use of IVF treatment and, once having intervened, to the detailed rules it lay down in order to achieve a balance between the competing public and private interests (paragraph 82).
5. We are unable to subscribe to the Court’s decision that it is more appropriate to analyse the case as one concerning positive obligations.
6. We see the case as one of interference with the applicant’s right to respect for the decision to become a genetically related parent. We can accept that the interference was prescribed by law and had a legitimate aim in terms of the protection of public order and morals and the rights of others. But was this interference necessary and proportionate in the special circumstances of the case? We consider that the applicant’s right to decide to become a genetically related parent weighs heavier than that of J’s decision not to become a parent in the present case. Our reasons are as follows:
i) The 1990 Act does not provide for the possibility of taking into consideration the very special medical condition affecting the applicant. We can agree with the majority that, in particular where an issue is of a morally and ethically delicate nature, a bright line rule may best serve the various – often conflicting – interests at stake. It has been said that "the advantage of a clear law is that it provides certainty." But it has also been admitted that "its disadvantage is that if it is too clear – categorical – it provides too much certainty and no flexibility". ^{noot 1} Therefore, given the particular circumstances of the case, the main problem lies in the absolute nature of the "bright line rule".
ii) In the instant case the majority’s approach resulted not simply in the applicant’s decision to have a genetically related child being thwarted but in the effective eradication of any possibility of having a genetically related child, thus rendering any such decision now or at any later time meaningless.
7. Therefore, in our view the application of the 1990 Act in the applicant’s circumstances is disproportionate. Because of its absolute nature, the legislation precludes the balancing of competing interests in this particular case. In fact, even though the majority accepts that a balance has to be struck between the conflicting Article 8 rights of the parties to the IVF treatment (paragraph 90), no balance is possible in the circumstances of the present case since the decision upholding J’s choice not to become a parent involves an absolute and final elimination of the applicant’s decision. Rendering empty or meaningless a decision of one of the two parties cannot be considered as balancing the interests. It is to be noted that the case is not about the possibility of adopting a child or hosting a donated embryo (see paragraph 72). Incidentally, J will still be able to take a decision to become a parent of his own child, whereas the applicant has had her last chance.
8. The applicant underwent surgery to remove her ovaries (26 November 2001). Therefore, the eggs that were extracted from her for IVF treatment were her last chance to have a genetically related child. J not only knew this fact very well, but also gave her an assurance that he wanted to be the father of her child. Without such an assurance, the applicant could have tried to seek other ways to have a child of her own. In paragraph 90 of the judgment, where the majority tries to strike a balance between the rights and interests of the applicant and of J, no weight is given to this "assurance" element, that is, to the fact that the applicant acted in good faith, relying on the assurance given to her by J. The decisive date was 12 November 2001: the date when the eggs were fertilized and six embryos created. From that moment on, J was no longer in control of his sperm. An embryo is a joint product of two people, which, when planted into the uterus, will turn into a baby. The act of destroying an embryo also involves destroying the applicant’s eggs. In this sense too, the British legislation has failed to strike the right balance.
9. The particular circumstances of the case lead us to believe that the applicant’s interests weigh more heavily than J’s interests and that the United Kingdom authorities’ failure to take this into account constitutes a violation of Article 8.
10. Once again, we would like to emphasize that we agree with the majority that the 1990 Act per se is not contrary to Article 8 and that the consent rule is important for IVF treatment. We agree that, looking at the relevant legislation of the other States, different approaches emerge and that the Court is justified in saying that there is no European consensus on the details of regulation of IVF treatment. As we have said, however, we see the instant case differently since its circumstances make us look beyond the mere question of consent in a contractual sense. The values involved and issues at stake as far the applicant’s situation is concerned weigh heavily against the formal contractual approach taken in this case.
11. Given the importance of the matter and the extreme nature of her situation, it is difficult for us to infer anything from the fact that she knew that "as a matter of law, J would be free to withdraw consent to implantation at any moment" (paragraph 88). Surely one is not suggesting that Ms Evans – in addition to all that she had to go through – was also contemplating the probability of J withdrawing his consent. It is once again obvious that the case does not sit comfortably with the formal scheme of law that has been applied to it.
12. A sensitive case like this cannot be decided on a simplistic, mechanical basis, namely, that there is no consensus in Europe, therefore the Government have a wide margin of appreciation; the legislation falls within the margin of appreciation; and this margin extends to the rules it lays down in order to achieve a balance between the competing public and private interests.
Certainly, States have a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to enacting legislation governing the use of IVF. However, that margin of appreciation should not prevent the Court from exercising its control, in particular in relation to the question whether a fair balance between all competing interests has been struck at the domestic level. ^{noot 1a} The Court should not use the margin of appreciation principle as a merely pragmatic substitute for a thought-out approach to the problem of proper scope of review. ^{noot 2a}
13. To conclude, unlike the majority we consider that the legislation has not struck a fair balance in the special circumstances of the case. Where the effect of the legislation is such that, on the one hand, it provides a woman with the right to take a decision to have a genetically related child but, on the other hand, effectively deprives a woman from ever again being in this position, it inflicts in our view such a disproportionate moral and physical burden on a woman that it can hardly be compatible with Article 8 and the very purposes of the Convention protecting human dignity and autonomy.
14. Concerning Article 14 of the Convention we would like to say the following:
It could be that for the purposes of Article 14 the closest comparator is an infertile man, which was the example given by the trial judge, Wall J (paragraph 23). However, even this comparison does not illustrate the whole complexity of the instant case. It is recognised by those international institutions with a specific mandate to focus on the rights of women that it is justified and necessary to address "the health rights of women from the perspective of women’s needs and interests in view of distinctive features and factors which differ for women in comparison to men, such as:
(a) biological factors …,
such as their … reproductive function … (CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24 (20th session, 1999))". A woman is in a different situation as concerns the birth of a child, including where the legislation allows for artificial fertilisation methods. We believe therefore that the proper approach in the instant case was that adopted under Article 14 in the caseThlimmenos v Greece, recognising that different situations require different treatment. ^{noot 1b} We see the circumstances of the applicant in this light not least because of the excessive physical and emotional burden and effects ^{noot 2b} caused by her condition, and it is on this basis that we voted for a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.

Annotatie: prof. mr. J. de Boer

Noot
1.
In de beginjaren van het bestaan van het Europese Hof voor de rechten van de mens, toen nog weinig zaken te beslissen waren, waren de arresten zonder meer van exceptioneel hoge kwaliteit. Thans is de werkdruk enorm – per 1 januari 2007 zijn 89.900 zaken aanhangig – en zolang de Raad van Europa niet wil accepteren dat een radicaal verlofsysteem (waarbij de rechter een positieve keuze maakt om een zaak eruit te lichten) de enige uitweg is, zal dit wel zo blijven. Een gegarandeerde kwaliteit hebben nog steeds de arresten van de Grote Kamer ("Grand Chamber") van het Europese Hof, aangezien (nog ervan afgezien dat met zeventien in plaats van zeven rechters wordt recht gesproken) het de Grote Kamer wel vergund wordt alle tijd te nemen. Over de werkwijze van de Grote Kamer, zie de "Straatsburgse myj/mering" van de huidige Nederlandse rechter in het Europese Hof, Egbert Myjer, in NJCM-Bulletin 2005, p. 1058 e.v. De arresten van de Grote Kamer leveren daarom in beginsel "leading cases" op, wat natuurlijk niet uitsluit dat over de juistheid van de uitkomst verschillend kan worden gedacht, ook door de leden van de Grote Kamer zelf (in de onderhavige zaak Evans was de stemverhouding overigens dertien tegen vier). Bij het aanhalen van een arrest van het Europese Hof dat door de Grote Kamer is gewezen, dient zulks vermeld te worden (GK of GC).
2.
Een "gewone" kamer, van zeven rechters, kan afstand van rechtsmacht doen ten gunste van de Grote Kamer, tenzij – wat opmerkelijk is – één der partijen daartegen bezwaar maakt (art. 30 EVRM). Ook is het mogelijk (en dat is in casu gebeurd) dat na de uitspraak van de kamer van zeven rechters een der partijen (in casu Evans) verwijzing naar de Grote Kamer verzoekt en dit verzoek door een college van vijf rechters van de Grote Kamer wordt aanvaard (art. 43 EVRM). De kamer van zeven rechters in de onderhavige zaak-Evans deed uitspraak op 7 maart 2006. Deze uitspraak, die grotendeels overeenstemt met die van de Grote Kamer, is (negatief) geannoteerd door Forder en Whittingham in NJCM-Bulletin 2006, 863 en (positief) door Hendriks in Gezondheidszorg Jurisprudentie (GJ) 2006, 43.
3.
In het onderhavige arrest ging het om het volgende. Natallie Evans kreeg te horen dat haar eierstokken wegens tumoren moesten worden verwijderd. Besloten werd vóór de eierstokoperatie eicellen van haar te verwijderen, deze in vitro te bevruchten met het zaad van haar levensgezel, de embryo’s in te vriezen en twee jaren na de eierstokoperatie over te gaan tot implantatie in haar baarmoeder. Evans heeft nog geïnformeerd of het ook mogelijk was haar eicellen onbevrucht in te vriezen, maar van de zijde van de kliniek werd haar medegedeeld dat daardoor de kans op succes kleiner zou zijn en dat de kliniek daarvoor niet kon zorgen. Haar levensgezel heeft haar toen verzekerd dat ze niet ongerust hoefde te zijn, dat hij van haar hield en van haar een kind wilde. Binnen bedoelde twee jaren liep de relatie toch stuk en deelde Evans" voormalige levensgezel aan de kliniek mee niet in te stemmen met een implantatie. Ingevolge de Engelse wetgeving had dit als consequentie dat de embryo’s moesten worden vernietigd. Evans vorderde tevergeefs in rechte dat toch tot implantatie werd overgegaan.
4.
De Engelse wetgeving (Schedule 3 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990), evenals trouwens de Nederlandse (art. 5 lid 2 en art. 8 lid 2Embryowet), vereist een voortdurende instemming van zowel de vrouw als de man, ook na de kunstmatige bevruchting. Er bestaat, wat de instemming betreft, wetgeving in Europa waarin de man na de kunstmatige bevruchting buiten spel staat, althans niet meer kan terugtreden ( 39-41), zoals ook het geval is na een natuurlijke bevruchting. Voorts zijn er rechterlijke uitspraken in de Verenigde Staten en Israël (niet op specifieke wetgeving betrekking hebbende) waarin cruciaal is of er nog een alternatief is voor de vrouw om van een eigen kind zwanger te worden ( 44 en 49). Dit alternatief ontbrak in de onderhavige zaak. Evans" eierstokken waren immers verwijderd. Zij zou – door adoptie of eiceldonatie aan haar – slechts moeder kunnen worden van een aan een ándere vrouw genetisch verwant kind.
5.
Evans klaagde voor het Europese Hof in de eerste plaats over schending van het recht op leven van de embryo’s, bedoeld in art. 2 EVRM ("1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law …"). Echter, in de zaak Vo v. France (EHRM [GK] 8 juli 2004, NJ 2006, 52, m.nt. EAA, NJCM-Bulletin 2005, p. 579 e.v., m.nt. HJ) was reeds geoordeeld dat de kwestie wanneer het recht op leven begint, valt binnen de "margin of appreciation" van de verdragssluitende Staten. Onder Engels recht kan een embryo geen aanspraak maken op een recht op leven. Er was derhalve geen sprake van een schending van art. 2 EVRM ( 56 jo 54).
6.
In de tweede plaats klaagde Evans over schending van art. 8 EVRM ("1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life …"). Volgens het Europese Hof omvat "private life" mede het recht op respect voor zowel de beslissing om wel als die om niet ouder van een kind te worden ( 71) en tevens, toegespitst op het onderhavige geval – waarin het, zoals gezegd, ging om een laatste kans van Evans – het recht op respect voor de beslissing om in genetisch opzicht ouder te worden ( 72).
7.
In casu ging het om een zuivere botsing van twee mensenrechten van dezelfde aard. Immers, als aan Evans zou worden toegestaan de embryo’s te gebruiken, zou haar voormalige levensgezel tot het ouderschap gedwongen worden ( 73). Het Europese Hof stelt echter vast dat ook publieke belangen meespelen (waaronder die van "upholding the principle of the primacy of consent and promoting legal clarity and certainty") ( 74).
8.
Volgens het Europese Hof gaat het hier niet om een eventuele schending van een primair negatieve verplichting van het Verenigd Koninkrijk (een "interference" als bedoeld in art. 8 lid 2 EVRM), maar om de vraag of het Verenigd Koninkrijk zijn positieve uit art. 8 lid 1 EVRM voortvloeiende verplichtingen heeft geschonden, al lijkt dit verder niet uit te maken (behalve dat het stappenplan van art. 8 lid 2 EVRM niet behoeft te worden gevolgd). De belangrijkste kwestie hier is volgens het Europese Hof, zoals ook in de zaak Odièvre (EHRM [GK]13 februari 2003, NJ 2003, 587, m.nt. SW, NJCM-Bulletin 2003, p. 774 e.v., m.nt. CJF), of de desbetreffende Britse wetgeving zoals in casu toegepast een eerlijk evenwicht heeft gebracht in de conflicterende private en publieke belangen. In dit verband aanvaardt het Europese Hof dat in casu de toestemming van de voormalige levenspartner van Evans aldus moet worden uitgelegd dat hij instemde met behandeling van hen samen en niet met gebruik van de embryo’s door Evans alleen ( 76).
9.
In het onderhavige geval komt aan de verdragssluitende Staten een ruime "margin of appreciation" toe, zowel wat betreft de beslissing om al dan niet wetgeving inzake in vitro fertilisatie (IVF) tot stand te brengen als, indien daartoe is besloten, wat betreft de details van de inhoud daarvan ( 82). Het gebruik van IVF roept gevoelige morele en ethische kwesties op tegen de achtergrond van zich snel ontwikkelende medische en wetenschappelijke ontwikkelingen en over de vragen die in het onderhavige geval spelen bestaat geen overeenstemming ("no clear common ground") binnen de lid-Staten van de Raad van Europa ( 79-81).
10.
Ik ben geneigd te menen dat indien tot een concrete individuele belangenafweging zou worden overgegaan, de balans in het voordeel van Evans doorslaat. Nog afgezien van een grotere fysieke en emotionele betrokkenheid van de vrouw in het algemeen, voor de kinderloze Evans is het de laatste kans. Haar in art. 8 EVRM beschermde recht genetisch moeder te worden wordt door de Engelse wetgeving niet slechts beperkt, het recht gaat definitief verloren. Haar gewezen vriend kan, zo mag worden aangenomen, nog wel genetisch vader worden. Bij natuurlijke bevruchting zou de vriend zonder meer gebonden zijn, terwijl in casu de onmogelijkheid van onmiddellijke implantatie na bevruchting veroorzaakt werd door een Evans persoonlijk betreffende omstandigheid (haar eierstokoperatie die noopte tot een wachttijd van twee jaren). Dat na een natuurlijke bevruchting partijen uit elkaar gaan is voorts niet ongewoon. En in het bijzonder: de vriend had haar gerustgesteld, al gebeurde zulks in liefde, toen zij informeerde naar de mogelijkheid van invriezing van haar onbevruchte eicellen waardoor een kans op het genetisch moederschap niet afhankelijk was geworden van de instemming van haar toenmalige vriend. Hier staat uiteraard tegenover de emotionele belasting van de ex-vriend om een kind te krijgen bij zijn ex-vriendin hoewel dat nog voorkomen kan worden. Dat de ex-vriend wellicht alimentatieplichtig wordt ten opzichte van h

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Rechters

Rozakis, C.L.; Costa, J.-P.; Nicolas Bratza; Zupancic, B.M.; Lorenzen, P.; Tü rmen,; R.; Butkevych, V.; Vajic, N.; Tsatsa-Nikolovska, M.; Baka, A.B.; Kovler, A.; Zagr